The INTOSAI Mexico Declaration provides a summary of good practice for the independence of government auditors. However, as in many parts of the world, this ideal is not achieved in many Sub-Saharan African countries. This includes both the English speaking and the French speaking countries. The picture is complex, especially in Francophone countries where there is usually more than one type of entity that provides some sort of audit function for central government. The roles and relative strengths of these different types of audit institution (usually Court of Accounts and General State Inspectorate) need to be clearly understood. This paper provides an introduction to their roles and considers their relative levels of independence against the INTOSAI guidance on independence from the Mexico Declaration. It concludes that, despite recent improvements, neither type of organisation achieves the levels of independence envisaged by INTOSAI nor are they adequately resourced. As a result co-operation between all public audit functions is more important than consideration of their relative levels of independence.
Introduction
In almost all French speaking Sub-Saharan African countries there is a General State Inspectorate 31 (usually called an Inspection générale d'Etat, but other titles are used). This type of institution evolved in post-colonial Africa and so has no parallels in France, Canada or other industrial French speaking countries. Some public financial management advisors consider the General State Inspectorate to be an internal audit institution and most PEFA reports make this assumption. However, in around a third of Francophone African countries the General State Inspectorate is the Supreme Audit Institution and the member of INTOSAI for their country.
It has been argued that General State Inspectorates should not be considered as external auditors or supreme audit institutions as they are part of the executive branch of government. In contrast the Courts of Accounts 32 (Cours des comptes) are claimed to be outside and functionally independent of the executive.
General State Inspectorates are usually appointed by the president (or sometimes by the prime minister) and their annual reports are sent to these officials rather than to parliament. However, this may also be the case for Court of Accounts and, indeed for Auditors General in Anglophone countries. Independence is not easy to achieve or maintain for any Supreme Audit Institution. The current president of the Court of Accounts in France was, for example, appointed by Sarkozy, the French president, in early 2010. In addition, the judiciary and indeed parliaments in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have the independence achieved in many OECD countries, for example, the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (2008: 120) report on Burkina Faso concluded that:
 Financial and managerial/administrative autonomy and the availability of appropriate human, material, and monetary resources.
Multiple Audit Institutions in Many Countries
INTOSAI requires each country to nominate a Supreme Audit Institution, however, in many countries there are several entities which contribute to the function of a Supreme Audit Institution. The public sector in most countries consists of a complex amalgam of different types of entities. These include central government ministries, departments and agencies, sub-national governments (states, provinces, local governments etc) and state owned enterprises (or parastatal organizations as they are usually termed in Africa). In many countries, the Supreme Audit Institution is only responsible for central government. So, for example, in the UK and US the Supreme Audit Institution is not responsible for the audit of local (or state) governments (as is also the case in Nigeria and Ethiopia). In France and other countries regional Courts of Accounts are responsible for the audit of local governments. In addition, in some countries, state owned enterprises are not audited by the Supreme Audit Institution, they may be audited by private audit firms (for example, in UK and Nigeria) or a separate institution, for example, the Audit Service Commission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (and previously in Tanzania). As a result, there is a spectrum of different approaches. In Ghana there is a powerful Auditor General who is responsible for the audit of almost the totality of the public sector, in contrast in Nigeria there are 74 Auditors General and none of them are allowed to audit the accounts of state owned enterprises (Wynne 2010) .
Models of Supreme Audit Institution in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa
Francophone Sub-Saharan African countries have two types of institution which undertake external audit type functions, either of which may be designated as the Supreme Audit Institution for an individual country:
 the Court of Accounts is a division of the Supreme Court or separate court within the judicial system. The individual members of the court (judges or magistrates) are led by a president who is generally appointed by the president of the relevant country. The court, with the support of its staff, judges the legality and regularity of the transactions and accounts of individual public accountants and reports to Parliament on the overall State Account. There is limited follow up of the Court's reports by Parliament. The professional staff traditionally have a legal rather than accounting or audit backgrounds, but this is expanding in several countries  the General State Inspectorate reports either to the president or the country's prime minister (rather than to parliament), but it is largely independent of the state bureaucracy and has access to all state institutions, public servants and their documents. It usually largely sets its own annual programme. The professional staff of the General State Inspectorate are usually educated in public financial management at specialist higher education institutions. If irregularities are found they are reported to the relevant ministry or other agency for appropriate action to be taken (Wynne, 2010) .
The Court of Accounts, as part of the judiciary, may be considered to be independent of the executive, but their members may be appointed by the president or the council of ministers and their reports may not be submitted direct to parliament. The Court of Accounts produces two annual reports. The first is sent to all members of parliament and reviews the execution of the budget. The second annual public report is sent to the president rather than to parliament and may be made public (Bouvier, Esclassan & Lassale, 2004) .
The main thrust of audit reforms in Francophone Sub-Saharan African countries in recent years has been the move from the Court of Accounts being a chamber of the supreme court (Chambre des Comptes) to being a court in its own right (Cour des Comptes). However, unless the appointment of the court's president and magistrates is changed, the courts are provided with greater resources and the relationship with parliament is strengthened it is not clear that such reforms will greatly improve the independence of the Court of Accounts (Wynne, 2010) .
As the General State Inspectorate is accountable to the president (or the prime minister) they may also have a high degree of independence from the entities (ministries, departments and agencies) which they audit. A distinction could perhaps be made between independence from the executive and independence from the entities which are subject to audit. If the General State Inspectorate has the support of a strong president they may in fact have considerably more independence from the ministries and other bodies which they audit than a Court of Accounts whose budget is usually submitted through the Ministry of Finance before being agreed by parliament (Wynne, 2010) . In addition, there has been a trend in recent years for more General State Inspectorates to make their annual reports public.
The following General State Inspectorates are all members of INTOSAI and so are the Supreme Audit Institutions for their countries (each of these countries also has a Court of Accounts or equivalent):
Until 2007 the General State Inspectorate of Burkina Faso was also the member of INTOSAI for that country. 
Wide Scope of Francophone Supreme Audit Institutions
Both the General State Inspectorate and the Court of Accounts have a wider scope than would be expected for Auditors General in Anglophone countries. They have the power to follow public money, something that was only recommended in the UK by the Sharman review in 2001 (Sharman) . This report defined public money as:
All money that comes into the possession of, or is distributed by, a public body, and money raised by a private body where it is doing so under statutory authority (Sharman 2001: 15) The Sharman report also recommended that public money should be subject to audit by public auditors. This principle is generally followed in Francophone countries and the General State Inspectorate and the Court of Accounts have a wide remit to audit the following:  all public services, offices and organizations  local authorities  parastatal bodies, public companies, enterprises and establishments  public projects and development agencies  any bodies benefiting from public financial support (state aid).
The final bullet point may be extended to include all bodies making public appeals for funds and so may include insurance companies, pension funds and trade unions. In Cameroon this may be extended still further and the General State Inspectorate may audit any private bodies that are strategic for the nation or related to national defence. In Senegal the scope of the Court of Accounts includes all those organizations in the above bullet points, all organizations controlled directly or indirectly by these entities and national appeals for funds from the public and the organizations benefiting from such appeals (World Bank 2009).
Specific Role of the Court of Accounts
In contrast to this wide scope, the Court of Accounts, has a very limited role. The core and original role of the Court of Accounts is to confirm or otherwise the legality of the accounts of the public accountants. If their accounts are found to be legal and regular, the public accountant is given quietus, or full discharge, and so is freed of any further personal or financial responsibility for the sums of money that they have paid (Bouvier, Esclassan & Lassale 2004) . If any errors or irregularities are found then the public accountant may be required to repay the money concerned and, in addition, they may be required to pay a fine.
The other core role of the Court of Accounts is to provide a report which is sent with the budget out-turn report (financial statements -loi de règlement) of the government to the National Assembly. This report may include some broad comments on the level of payments and receipts by the government compared to the budget for the relevant financial year and also a commentary of the general economic and financial environment of the country (Court of Accounts of Ivory Coast 2006a). This report also includes a formal opinion or certificate of conformity between the level of payment orders paid by the public accountants and the value of the payments orders raised by the officials with responsibility for raising orders (ordonnateurs) (Lienert 2003) .
Thus, for example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the first paragraph of article 52 of the Organic Law on State Finances requires that, "the draft budget out-turn report is accompanied by a report of the Court of Accounts and a general declaration of conformity between the administrative account [of the ordonnateurs] and the management account [of the public accountants] (Court of Accounts, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2009).
In addition to this report to the National Assembly, the Court of Accounts provides a General Public Report on the activities of the Court. This is usually addressed to the President and may be made public. This provides general background details of the activities of the Court of Accounts for the year concerned, significant developments, major findings and may include details of training received. It will also usually include a summary of the main activities of the Court and any significant developments. This may also include a summary of the reports to the National Assembly including the formal opinion on conformity between the administrative account and the management account (Court of Accounts, Burkina Faso, 2009).
The above core role of the Court of Accounts is largely limited to an audit of the activities of the public accountants. The audit of other public officials with financial responsibilities may be added to the role of the Court of Accounts through a separate court or chamber, These quite specific roles of the Court of Accounts mean that the role of the General State Inspectorate may be complementary to the Court. In France, the role of the Court of Accounts has expanded. In Francophone Africa the General State Inspectorate has generally been used to fulfil these additional roles.
Different ways of classifying public audit
In Anglophone countries a distinction is usually made between the internal auditor and the external auditor (Auditor General). However, under the French tradition, the control of budgetary execution is divided in to administrative, jurisdictional and parliamentary control. Administrative control is exercised by a number of entities. These generally include the Financial Controllers, General Financial Inspectors and the General State Inspectorate. In the French approach the General State Inspectorate is seen as the supreme body for administrative control (Abdourhamane, Crouzel and Claassens 2004, Bouvier, Esclassan and Lassale 2004) . Many Anglophone experts consider that each of these three bodies to be internal audit functions. However, the last two at least can equally considered to be external audit functions as they report externally to the bodies they are reviewing. The General Financial Inspectors review financial operations and management across central government ministries, departments and agencies on behalf of the Minister of Finance. Similarly the General State Inspectorate review all ministries, departments and agencies on behalf of the President. Unlike internal auditors, these two bodies do not provide advice to the management of the organizations that they review, but are monitoring, reviewing or auditing the organizations on behalf of a third party.
Jurisdictional control is exercised by the Court of Accounts and related bodies, for example, regional courts of audit and Courts of Budgetary Discipline. These bodies are courts, rather than audit institutions, and their senior officials are magistrates or judges. Public financial management officials are tried by the Court of Accounts. If they are found guilty of responsibility for an irregularity may be required to pay a fine. The Court of Accounts assists the President of the Republic, the Government and the National Assembly in the control of the execution of the budget (Constitution of Senegal 2001).
Parliamentary control is exercised by the National Assembly. Before the beginning of the financial year the National Assembly passes the annual budget allowing the government to collect revenue and make payments (finance law or loi de finance). At the end of the year the National Assembly passes the budget out-turn report (loi de règlement) this reconciles actual receipts and payments to the annual budget. It is the act by which parliament accepts the receipts and payments made by the government on its behalf.
Thus under the French system there are three bodies which are supreme in terms of monitoring and controlling their aspect of the budget. These are the General State Inspectorate (administrative control), the Court of Accounts (judicial control) and the National Assembly (parliamentary control).
Origins of the General State Inspectorate
Under the French approach, there are a series of inspectors for each public service, for example, inspectors of education, inspectors of health etc. In 1906 the Governor General of French West Africa created the Inspection Service of Administrative Affairs. This body reported directly to the Governor and provided findings and propositions, which were less prescriptive than recommendations (Gueye 2008 ).
This service was reorganized in 1936 and again in 1937. At this stage the service was independent and essentially mobile. Inspectors were not allowed to take on other management or executive responsibilities. The scope of their work was now all the administrative services except for the treasury and the technical services of the colonies head quarters. The inspectors had the obligation to inspect each territorial region every year and to provide an annual report of their activities, observations and follow up (Gueye 2008) .
In 1943 the name of this service was changed to the General Inspection of Administrative Affairs. The General Inspector was nominated by decree of the Governor and chosen from amongst the governors of the colonies or the chief administrators. The service was based in Dakar and covered all of French West Africa (Gueye 2008 The independent Francophone countries generally had strong presidents and weak or nonexistent parliaments. In these circumstances it would appear to make more sense to have a public audit institution which reports to the president rather than to parliament. As a result, in several independent Francophone African countries General State Inspectorates were established. In contrast, the Court of Accounts in these countries did not exist or in name only. So, for example, in Burkina Faso, although the Court of Accounts was mentioned in the 1960 constitution it was not, in reality established until 2002 (PEFA 2010 
Responsibilities for value for money and anti-corruption
In recent years at least some General State Inspectorates have taken on responsibility for value for money or performance audit. In Senegal 
The paper finishes with some conclusions and final thoughts. (2002) states that the National Assembly is assisted in controlling the accounts of the nation by the Court of Accounts which it may require to undertake any enquiry or study on public financial management (article 105).
33 "La Cour des comptes est la juridiction supérieure de contrôle des finances publiques."
Guidelines
Legislation that spells out, in detail, the extent of SAI independence is required (INTOSAI 2007b) .
These Constitutional provisions do not necessarily provide the Courts of Audit with the independence they require. The State President is often the guarantor of independence of the judiciary (Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Burkina Faso and Mali). However, the president may use this power to restrict the work of the Court of Accounts, for example, the President of Senegal threatened to close the Court of Accounts over its plans to review the management of an agency managed by his son and an NGO employing his wife. Only the intervention of the IMF stopped the budget of the Court of Accounts being cut by two thirds (World Bank 2009) . In Algeria the current President has stopped the publication of the annual general activity report of the Court of Accounts since he came to power in 1999. In 1969 the Court of Accounts of Cameroon was suppressed by Presidential decree and it was not re-established until 1996 (Bizeme 2010) The provisions of the Constitution are generally supported by more detailed laws. In some cases, for example the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burkina Faso, this is an organic law which provides more protection against amendment than a normal law. However, the laws may not be up to date, apply best practice or be implemented as required. Although Chambers (or Courts) of accounts were established constitutionally and legally from independence (1960) in severally countries these bodies did not come into effective existence until much later. For example, in Mali the Court of Accounts (Section of the Supreme Court) only produced four reports in the twenty years leading to 2008. Similarly in Burkina Faso, although the constitution made provision for a chamber of accounts it was not established in fact until 1984 when three judges were appointed. However, regular annual reports for the National Assembly and public reports were only produced from 2003-04 after the Court of Accounts had been established.
The proposed organic law of the Côte d'Ivoire will still allow the accounts of public accountants to be subject to the procedures of the Court of Accounts only at least every five years (World Bank 2009b).
The General State Inspectorates are not referred to in the Constitution of any of the eight larger countries, but their main attributes are detailed in laws which have all been amended within the last 15 years. These laws have usually been subject to regular reform so, for example, the General State Inspectorate in Senegal was created in 1964 and the relevant law was then amended in 1974 , 1987 , 2005 (Keïta 2007 
Guidelines:
The applicable legislation specifies the conditions for appointments, re-appointments, employment, removal and retirement, of the head of SAI and members of collegial institutions, who are: The Court of Accounts may be considered to have more independence in terms of appointment of its members as the President is usually advised on their appointment by the Higher Judicial Council or the Minister of Justice. However, in Mali, for example, the "nomination of the members of the Court is more political than being based on their professional competences" (Ezeilo 2008: 28) . Similarly, in Burkina Faso, the PEFA report (2007)  collection of revenues owed to the government or public entities;
 legality and regularity of government or public entities accounts and entities;
 quality of financial management and reporting; and  economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of government or public entities operations.
Except when specifically required to do so by legislation, SAIs do not audit government or public entities policy but restrict themselves to the audit of policy implementation.
While respecting the laws enacted by the Legislature that apply to them, SAIs are free from direction or interference from the Legislature or the Executive in the  selection of audit issues;
 planning, programming, conduct, reporting, and follow-up of their audits;
 organization and management of their office; and  enforcement of the decisions where the application of sanctions is part of their mandate.
SAIs should not be involved or be seen to be involved, in any manner, whatsoever, in the management of the organizations that they audit (INTOSAI 2007b).
As indicated in the introduction to this paper both the Courts of Accounts and the General State Inspectorates usually have a wide mandate to review the whole of the public sector and other organizations in receipt of public funds. This is better than a number of OECD countries.
But especially Courts of Accounts may be restricted by their lack of resources and so their work often concentrates on the audit of accounts of Public Accountants. In Senegal the Auditor General (head of the General State Inspectorate) has stated that "the General State Inspectorate is neutral and objective in its work. It constitutes an impregnable fortress that cannot be at the service of any politician" (Rewmi.com 2007) . "The general assembly of the General State Inspectorate develops an annual programme of work which is then passed to the President for approval. Generally the programmes are approved… But the President can require the General State Inspectorate to undertake an occasional mission".
Similarly in Togo, the annual work programme of the General State Inspectorate is agreed to by the State President who may request occasional missions to be undertaken. However, this institution indicated that it sets less than 80% of its annual programme (Dehove 2010 Most of the Courts of Audit and the General State Inspectorates generally have a sufficiently broad mandate and large discretion, in the discharge of their functions. However, the Courts of Audit may be restricted in their legal mandates, and the level of resources they are provided with, to undertaking audits of the accounts of public accountants. They may not have the express legal power to undertake performance audit. At least some of the General State Inspectorates are also restricted by having their annual work plans and the terms of reference agree by the State President. However, they generally have a wider remit than the Courts of Audit and often have the express power to undertake performance audit and anti-corruption work.
Principle 4: Unrestricted access to information
Members of the Courts of Accounts and General State Inspectorates generally have full access to the information they need to complete their assignments. The only member of CREFIAF which said it did not have free access to information, the ability to review evidence and to visit the necessary offices was Guinea (a General State Inspectorate) (Dehove 2010 ).
34
La programmation annuelle (environ 90% des contrôles) ne dépend que de l'IGE ; le premier ministre envoie chaque année une lettre de mission formelle à l'IGE sans instruction de contrôle précis, l'IGE élabore son programme de travail et le transmit pour information au Premier ministre.
Guideline
SAIs should have adequate powers to obtain timely, unfettered, direct, and free access to all the necessary documents and information, for the proper discharge of their statutory responsibilities.
In Senegal the members of the Court of Accounts have wide access to information in the field of their investigations (PEFA 2007) . Similarly, officials of the General State Inspectorate have their rights of access, enshrined in law and these are superior to many other African Supreme Audit Institutions. They have access to all documents even if classified confidential or secret, including secret national defense documents (Wynne 2010 
"When undertaking their inspections, the General State Inspectors have all the powers of investigation, information and interpretation. They have access to all sources of information and documentation, files, registers, correspondence, accounts etc and generally all documents that they judge necessary to fulfil their missions. No information may be refused even by private sector organizations relative to audited bodies. They are independent of the management that they inspect and their appreciation of the things they examine and the conclusions they draw."
Each Inspector of the General State Inspectorate of Cameroon has an identity card including their photograph and the personal signature of the President. This card details the access the Inspector has to any officials or documents required for them to undertake their work. If necessary, the card empowers the police to enable this access without delay. Most Supreme Audit Institutions in Francophone Africa produce an annual report which is made public. But few institutions are able to communicate with the public and none of the Court of Accounts or General State Inspectorates said they were feely able to do so in the recent CREFIAF survey (Dehove 2010) . Four of these institutions said they did not produce an annual report (three Courts of Accounts and one General State Inspectorate) (Dehove 2010) .
The Court of Accounts of Cameroon issued is first annual report (for 2006) in over thirty years in December 2007.
"The reports of the Court of Accounts in Mali are supposed to be public documents, but, in reality they are far from being accessible to the public" (Ezeilo 2008 ). In addition, the Court of Accounts has only produced two reports in the last ten years.
In Algeria the current President has stopped the publication of the annual report of the Cour des comptes since he came to power in 1999.
The General State Inspectorate of Senegal may publish its reports if they have been declassified by the President. It has developed "a new communications strategy with the right to inform the citizens… In this framework, the General State Inspectorate will present, each year, a report on the state of public governance" (Keïta 2007 ). Both the Courts of Accounts and General State Inspectorate now generally provide annual reports on the results of their audit work, but these reports may not necessarily be made public.
Courts of
Principle 6: The freedom to decide the content and timing of audit reports and to publish and disseminate them
Guidelines
SAIs are free to decide the content of their audit reports.
SAIs are free to make observations and recommendations in their audit reports, taking into consideration, as appropriate, the views of the audited entity.
Legislation specifies minimum audit reporting requirements of SAIs and, where appropriate, specific matters that should be subject to a formal audit opinion or certificate.
SAIs are free to decide on the timing of their audit reports except where specific reporting requirements are prescribed by law.
SAIs may accommodate specific requests for investigations or audits by the Legislature, as a whole, one of its commissions, or the government.
SAIs are free to publish and disseminate their reports, once they have been formally tabled or delivered to the appropriate authority-as required by law.
There are two main reports of the Court of Accounts:
 Public Report -annual activity report and findings/recommendations from audits of institutions undertaken (Le Rapport Public).
 Reports accompanying the budget out-turn report (sent to the president to send on to the National Assembly with the draft budget out-turn law) o presentation on the budget out-turn, observations and recommendations o report of conformity between the accounts of the general financial administration and the accounts of the principal public accountants.
The Code of Transparency of UMEOA (2009) (Wynne 2010) .
A summary of the position on publication of annual reports is shown in the following table: Similarly, a researcher on the Courts of Accounts of Mali and Niger could not gain access to the reports of either institution (Ezeilo 2008) .
The reports for the Court of Accounts of Congo, Djibouti and Guinea Bissau are not issued to parliament (Dehove 2010) . The Court of Accounts of Madagascar did not produce an annual report (PEFA 2006) , but one was produced and made public in 2009 (personal communication).
In Burkina Faso the annual reports of the General State Inspectorate and the Court of Accounts can both only be published with the permission of the State President (PEFA 2010), but in practice both reports are made public immediately after they have been issued to the State President. In addition, the content of the reports is determined by the institution itself. However, this has only been the case in the last five years for the Court of Accounts and the last three years for the General State Inspectorate. The General State Inspectorate manages to produce an annual report which is publically available within three or four months of the end of the year. In contrast, the Court of Accounts only produces its report by the end of the following year and this refers to the financial year for the year before. So for example the 2009 public report (on the 2008 financial year) of the Court of Accounts was nearly ready for publication at the end of 2010.
In Côte d'Ivoire, in 1990, it was obligatory for the annual public report of the Court of Accounts to be sent to the National Assembly and to be published in the Official Journal (Tam: 339):
However, the issue, publication and distribution [of the annual report of the Court of Accounts in Senegal] is not obligatory. It depends on the State President who is the sole judge of this opportunity.
Since 2001, the annual reports of the Court of Accounts of Senegal have been made available on its website. The report for 2001 said that it was its second General Public Report.
In recent years there has been a general increase in the publication of the annual reports of both the Court of Accounts and the General State Inspectorate. The annual public reports of the Courts of Accounts are usually publically available (in five of the eight largest countries). In contrast, for the General State Inspectorates, their annual reports are currently (early 2011) only publically available in two of the largest Francophone countries. In late December 2010 the General State Inspector of Niger, Gabriel Martin appeared on state television to provide an interim report of the work of the General State Inspectorate (Martin 2010 ).
Principle 7: The existence of effective follow-up mechanisms on SAI recommendations

Guidelines
SAIs submit their reports to the Legislature, one of its commissions, or an auditee's governing board, as appropriate, for review and follow-up on specific recommendations for corrective action.
SAIs have their own internal follow-up system to ensure that the audited entities properly address their observations and recommendations as well as those made by the Legislature, one of its commissions, or the auditee's governing board, as appropriate.
SAIs submit their follow-up reports to the Legislature, one of its commissions, or the auditee's governing board, as appropriate, for consideration and action, even when SAIs have their own statutory power for follow-up and sanctions.
The Code of Transparency of UMEOA (2009) Recommendations made by Courts of Accounts and General State Inspectorates are not usually followed up by these organizations or the National Assembly. However, it is more common for the General State Inspectorates to undertake such a formal follow-up and this may also include recommendations made by other inspectorates or internal auditors.
Principle 8: Financial and managerial/administrative autonomy and the availability of appropriate human, material, and monetary resources.
SAIs should have available necessary and reasonable human, material, and monetary resources-the Executive should not control or direct the access to these resources. SAIs manage their own budget and allocate it as appropriately.
The Legislature or one of its commissions is responsible for ensuring that SAIs have the proper resources to fulfill their mandate.
SAIs have the right of direct appeal to the Legislature if the resources provided are insufficient to allow them to fulfill their mandate.
Few Courts of Audit or General State Inspectorates comply with this principle. None of the 19 member institutions of CREFIAF suggested that they had adequate financial means to fulfil their mandate (Dehove 2010) . Only three of these institutions could defend their annual budgets in parliament (two were Court of Accounts and one a General State Inspectorate) (Dehove 2010 ).
The size of audit institutions in Francophone African countries is far smaller than those in Anglophone African countries. A recent AFROSAI survey found that on average there were 35 auditors for each Francophone member, whilst Anglophone members had an average of nearly 300 auditors each. This disparity in staffing is not explained by differences in the sizes of countries, although the French countries have, on average around half the population of Anglophone countries. But it may be explained, by the existence of more inspectorates or internal audit sections (as they are usually referred to).
In Francophone countries there are a variety of organizations that very broadly undertake similar work to the staff of offices of the Auditors General in Anglophone countries (ex post review/audit of payments). Thus in Burkina Faso, for example there is the Court of Accounts, the General State Inspectorate, the General Financial Inspectorate, the General Budgetary Inspectorate and the General Treasury Inspectorate. In total, these five organizations have approximately 135 professional staff (PEFA, Burkina Faso 2010) . In addition, there are also separate inspectorate services for both the customs and the taxation inspectorates. Thus the total professional staffing of all the audit functions in Burkina Faso is comparable to similar sized Anglophone countries, for example, Malawi and Zambia, where the Auditor General has less than 300 professional staff (personal correspondence).
The relatively small size of Supreme Audit Institutions in Francophone countries may also be explained, at least in part, by the level of salaries paid as the French public sector officials generally have higher salaries.
Schiavo-Campo and others (1997) In Mali the Auditor General's Office (Bureau de Vérificateur générale) also had 100 staff including 63 audit staff (ICGFM presentation 2008) .
The Courts of Accounts in many Francophone Sub-Saharan African countries are not strong nor well established institutions. In Mali, for example, for many years the Court of Accounts was understaffed, finding it difficult to achieve its objectives and causing a delay in the execution of its tasks. This problem was partly resolved by the increase of the number of magistrates from two in 2000 to nine in 2002 and 15 in 2003. However, the capacity of the Court of Accounts is still largely insufficient. An institutional analysis carried out in 2002, concluded that 60 magistrates would be needed to carry out all the tasks assigned to the accounts court (Ecorys 2006: 83) . The Court also suffers from a lack of general personnel (only 40 staff), offices, information, IT and archives (Toure 2004 
Independent trade unions
The independence of Supreme Audit Institutions may also be affected by the right of their staff to join trade unions and to take part in collective action. This right can provide some protection for the staff of these institutions against political interference and the quality of their conditions 37 "il importe de noter l'insuffisance des effectifs de la Cour des Comptes dont le dernier recrutement remonte à 1999, alors que ses attributions continuent à croître" of service. This is recognized in the United Nations ' Global Compact (UN, 2000) which is said to have universal consensus and has as the third principle of ten: 
Conclusions
In most African countries the external audit functions would benefit from significant strengthening. One recent overview suggested that: Despite this, the argument against the General State Inspectorate is that they are not independent of the executive and especially the State President, unlike the Court of Accounts. However, the main section of this paper has demonstrated that the two types of institutions have similar levels of independence as summarised in the following table: The above table indicates that for three of the eight Mexico principles the levels of independence of the two types of institution are approximately equal; for three the Courts of Accounts tend to be more independent; and for two the General State Inspectorates are on average more independent. This analysis suggests that both the Courts of Accounts and the General State Inspectorates would both benefit from greater independence rather than one type of entity being significantly more independent than the other. The General State Inspectorate is traditionally the supreme administrative control body and the Court of Accounts is responsible for juridical control.
In 2002 Transparency International made the following recommendations for further improvements in the quality of both the Court of Accounts and General State Inspectorate.
Court of Accounts
 The mission, objectives and the internal regulations should be defined and voted upon by parliament.  Systems should be developed to protect the autonomy of the magistrates, their nomination and career management.
 The decisions by the Court of Accounts in their evaluation of public accounts should be final and not subject to any further appeal to another body.  The annual reports of the Court of Accounts should be made public and subject to extensive publicity.  The Court of Accounts should be provided with the necessary human, financial and material resources to undertake their work.
General State Inspectorate
 General State Inspectorates should be able to determine the majority of their annual work programmes  The annual reports of the General State Inspectorates should be made public and subject to widespread publicity.
 The relevant authorities should take into account the propositions made by the General State Inspectorate, especially when these concern cases of fraud or corruption, and to recommendations to prevent these in future.  Recruitment to the General State Inspectorate should be by competitive examination to avoid favouritism. Staff should benefit from regulations to protect the security of their positions and their career development.
In some countries co-operation between the Court of Accounts and the General State Inspectorate has improved in recent years. The General State Inspectorate in Burkina Faso is responsible in law for the technical co-ordination of all organs of administrative control. For this reason it organizes an annual meeting for these bodies which the Court of Accounts attends along with the General Inspectorate of Finance, National Co-ordination of the Fight Against Fraud and technical inspection services (General State Inspectorate, Burkina Faso 2010) . Similarly in Senegal the General State Inspectorate has the responsibility to encourage and coordinate all the systems of internal control (Keïta 2007) .
As with the co-operation between internal audit and the Auditor General in Anglophone African countries, there are a number of ways in which this could be further improved including the following steps (Diamond 2002) :
 There should be proper coordination to ensure adequate audit coverage and to minimize duplication of effort.
 There should be access to each other's audit plans and programmes.
 Periodic meetings should be organized to discuss matters of mutual interest.
 There should be an exchange of audit reports.
 Institutional mechanisms should be created to ensure common understanding and sharing of audit techniques and methods.
 Sharing of training and exchange of staff for two to three years in each case.
An effective Supreme Audit function is essential to achieve sound public financial management, but this may be provided by more than one institution. In Francophone African countries, either the Court of Accounts or the General State Inspectorate may be nominated as the Supreme Audit Institution for that particularly country. However, these institutions play complementary roles. Despite significant improvements in recent years, further work is needed to optimize the independence, capacity and the resources available to both types of organization and to improve the level of co-operation between them.
